A Vault Only Protects What It Knows It Should Vault
Privileged Access Management (PAM) vaults, rotates, and brokers access for privileged accounts: the domain admins, root credentials, and service accounts an organization has identified as high-risk and onboarded into the vault. Once an account is in PAM, it's genuinely well protected. Rotation, session recording, and just-in-time elevation all do real work.
The gap isn't what PAM does with a vaulted account. It's the privileged accounts that never made it into the vault in the first place: a local admin credential created outside a change ticket, a service account provisioned with standing privilege nobody flagged, an AI agent that inherited elevated access by accident. PAM has no mechanism to discover an account it was never told about; onboarding into a vault is a deliberate, manual step, not something that happens automatically the moment an account becomes privileged.
An IVIP is the layer that finds those accounts. It continuously discovers privilege across the estate, including the accounts nobody nominated for a vault, and can route the ones that qualify into PAM directly, closing the gap between 'accounts PAM protects' and 'accounts that actually carry privilege.'